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A Theoretical Analysis of Habitat Conversion and Biodiversity
Conservation Over Time and Under Uncertainty
Abstract
We exploit the known links between natural habitats and biodiversity to pose and study the
biodiversity conservation question as an optimal stopping problem. We extend the extant literature
on this question by studying the role that autonomous and nonautonomous policies play in the
decision to conserve biodiversity over time and uncertainty. We first construct a dynamic and
stochastic model of decision making in the context of biodiversity conservation. Next, we use this
model to analyze the expected utility of a social planner when this planner uses, respectively,
autonomous and nonautonomous policies. Finally, we compare and contrast the properties of
autonomous and nonautonomous conservation policies and we discuss the magnitude of the flexibility
premium stemming from the maintenance of temporal flexibility in decision making.
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1. Introduction
A considerable amount of concern has been expressed in recent times about the decline in the
world’s diverse biological resources. Economists and ecologists now acknowledge that not only are
we losing biological diversity (hereafter biodiversity), we are losing it at an unparalleled rate
(Swanson, 1995a, p. xi). Casual explications for the problem of biodiversity loss abound. However,
it is only very recently that economists and ecologists have begun to combine their resources to
systematically analyze issues relating to the loss and the conservation of biodiversity.3 A salient
conclusion emanating from this joint “ecological-economic” approach to the subject is that when
considering the problem of biodiversity loss, it is generally inappropriate to focus on the loss of
genetic information. Instead, what researchers should be concentrating on are the nexuses between
biodiversity loss and the parallel loss of ecosystem resilience (Perrings et al., 1995b, pp. 16-17).
Beyond this general finding, economists and ecologists have analyzed three additional issues
related to biodiversity. These issues concern the measurement of biodiversity, a determination of the
causes for the decline in biodiversity, and the valuation of biodiversity. The measurement issue has
been studied by Weitzman (1992, 1993, 1995), Solow et al. (1993), and Solow and Polasky (1994).
These scholars have shown that the genetic distance between related species can be used to devise
an effective measure of biodiversity. This measure recognizes that the “optimal conservation policy
may be defined as the feasible action that yields the highest discounted expected value of diversity
(plus whatever other net benefits are attributed to various components)” (Weitzman, 1995, p. 22).
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It is salient to comprehend that this measurement issue has been guided by the realization that
conservation resources are scarce. Consequently, in order to ascertain how these scarce resources
ought to be allocated across competing needs, it is necessary to measure biodiversity.
Studies of the causes for the decline in biodiversity have been conducted by Barbier and
Rauscher (1995), Gadgil (1995), and Southgate (1995).4 By revealing a causal connection between
myopic policy-making and a diminution in biodiversity, these researchers have pointed to the need
for devising conservation policies that take into account the economics and the ecology of the
biodiversity loss problem. Specifically, Gadgil (1995, p. 107) has pointed out that such policies must
acknowledge that the problem of biodiversity loss is closely connected to “the ever-growing resource
demands of [citizens of the First World and the Third World elite]...and their willingness to permit
resource degradation in tracts outside their domain of concern.”
Finally, the valuation of biodiversity has become a major issue not only because of the
established connection between biodiversity loss and the loss of ecosystem resilience, but more
narrowly, because of its close connection to “biodiversity prospecting,” and therefore to the probable
discovery of new pharmaceutical products. Polasky and Solow (1995), Simpson et al. (1996) and
others have analyzed this valuation issue. These authors have shown that by deriving a demand curve
for native genetic resources, one can ascertain the marginal willingness to pay for the marginal species
and the marginal hectare of threatened habitat.
Although this body of research has certainly advanced our understanding of many facets of
the biodiversity conservation question, it is still true that the extant literature has not analyzed the
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effects that alternate policies have on the decision to conserve biodiversity and on a social planner’s
expected utility from conservation. Consequently, our paper has three objectives. However, before
we discuss the objectives themselves, it is necessary to first comment on the relationship between
natural habitats and biodiversity. The essential point is this: The conversion of natural habitats
invariably leads to a loss of biodiversity. For instance, Smith et al. (1995, p. 134) have remarked that
overexploitation, the introduction of exotic species, and habitat conversion are “the three primary
causes of...extinctions and endangerments...”5
The problems associated with habitat conversion are grave. Consider the case of tropical
forests, generally acknowledged to be an important source of biodiversity. As noted in Myers (1992,
pp. 175-176), commercial logging, fuelwood gathering, cattle raising, and forest farming operations
collectively result in the conversion of approximately 200,000 square kilometers of primary forest
every year. This massive conversion of tropical forests has given rise to the following two disturbing
statistics: First, the tropical forests of West Africa, the Greater Antilles, India, Madagascar, the
Philippines, and Atlantic Brazil have already been reduced to less than 10 per cent of their original
areas (Terborgh and van Schaik, 1997). Second, as pointed out in Terborgh (1992), outside of
protected areas, tropical forests are expected to endure for only about 35 to 40 more years.
Regrettably, despite the increased global attention to the loss of tropical forests, it does not appear
as though the rate of forest conversion is slowing down. Recent studies by Whitmore and Sayer
(1992) and by Aldhous (1993) suggest that this conversion rate is actually increasing in a number of
nations.
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With these sobering statistics in mind, let us now discuss the three objectives of this paper.
First, we construct a dynamic and stochastic model of decision making in the context of biodiversity
conservation. Next, we use our model to shed light on a question that, to the best of our knowledge,
has not been studied previously in the literature on the conservation of biodiversity. This question
concerns the expected utility of a social planner when this individual is able to choose between
autonomous (time independent) and nonautonomous (time dependent) conservation policies. Finally,
we compare and contrast the attributes of autonomous and nonautonomous policies and then we
discuss the magnitude of the flexibility premium arising from the maintenance of temporal flexibility
in decision making.
To see why the distinction between autonomous and nonautonomous policies is salient, note
the following: Autonomous policies are rigid and they do not permit a social planner to alter his or
her policy when new information is acquired. Put differently, new information about the consequences
of habitat conversion cannot be incorporated into the policy. In contrast, nonautonomous policies are
flexible and they permit the incorporation of new information about the effects of habitat conversion
into the policy. Therefore, intuitively one expects to observe a flexibility premium associated with the
use of a nonautonomous policy. Indeed, we explore the existence and the magnitude of this flexibility
premium in section 4 of this paper.
The theory of optimal stopping (see Ross (1983), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and Batabyal
(1998, 2000)) can be used to shed light on the objectives of this paper. Consequently, our paper can
also be thought of as an application of this theory to the problem of habitat conversion and
biodiversity conservation over time and under uncertainty. The papers that are most closely related
to our paper are Batabyal (1998, 2000). Both these papers study biodiversity conservation over time
6

and under uncertainty. However, the objective of Batabyal (1998) is exclusively on characterizing the
optimal time at which a habitat conversion process ought to be halted. In Batabyal (2000), the focus
is on studying the link between a social planner’s optimal conservation policy and the length of his
or her planning horizon. Neither paper has analyzed the properties of autonomous and
nonautonomous policies in the context of biodiversity conservation over time and under uncertainty.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework.
Section 3 uses this framework and provides a detailed analysis of the effects of autonomous and
nonautonomous policies on the expected utility of a social planner contemplating the conservation
of biodiversity. Section 4 discusses the properties of autonomous and nonautonomous conservation
policies and then comments on the magnitude of the premium arising from the maintenance of
temporal flexibility in decision making. Section 5 concludes and offers suggestions for future research
on the subject of this paper.
2. The Theoretical Framework
In order to keep things from getting unduly complicated, in the rest of this paper we shall
choose units so that the numerical values of all the pertinent variables and the distribution functions
are drawn from the interval (0,1]. Now, consider a country such as Indonesia in which the conversion
of natural habitat into developed land is taking place over time.6 As Wilson (1992) and Krautkraemer
(1995) have pointed out, estimates of the rate of species loss are generally based on the rate of habitat
loss. Therefore, we shall interpret the area of natural habitat as a measure of the stock of
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biodiversity.7 The conversion of natural habitat yields information about the consequences of
development and the existing stock of biodiversity. This link between habitat conversion and
information acquisition has been documented in the extant literature. For instance, Swanson (1995b,
p. 247) has noted that sequential “decision making regarding...conversions implies the passage of
time, and one component of time is the accumulation of information.”
A social planner who is interested in conserving the scarce biological resources in his or her
country receives this information sequentially over time and in packets. This planner has a strictly
monotonic and one-to-one utility function defined over these information packets. Because these
packets provide information about the consequences of development (habitat conversion) and the
existing stock of biodiversity, the resultant utility to the social planner is also about these two things.
Now, a policy that involves waiting indefinitely and never stopping the natural habitat conversion
process is a policy that results in the complete destruction of the existing stock of biodiversity. In
most practical instances, such a policy will be inadmissible. Consequently, we account for this by
imposing a constraint on the social planner’s optimization problem. This constraint says that the social
planner would like to stop the habitat conversion process by time T'1. 8 This means that if the planner
fails to stop the habitat conversion process by time T'1, then his or her utility is zero.
Our social planner receives information packets about the consequences of habitat conversion
7
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over time. These packets P1,P2,P3,... are received in accordance with a Poisson process9 with a fixed
rate ë'1. The packets themselves are independent random variables that are uniformly distributed
on the interval (0,1]. The receipt of a packet generates a certain level of utility by means of the social
planner’s utility function. In other words, this utility function maps information about the effects of
stopping conversion to utility from stopping conversion. Moreover, because the information packets
are uniformly distributed on (0,1] and because the utility function is strictly monotonic and one-toone, the utility levels U1,U2,U3,... themselves are also uniformly distributed random variables on the
interval (0,1]. Upon receipt of an information packet and the corresponding utility, the social planner
decides whether to stop the conversion of natural habitat or to permit conversion and wait for
additional information. In this paper, stopping the natural habitat conversion process should be
viewed as an action that results in the creation of a protected area. Examples of such protected areas
include Corbett National Park in India and the Pico da Neblina National Park in Brazil. The reader
will note that in essence, it is information that is the driving force behind the social planner’s decision
about when to stop the habitat conversion process.
In order to accomplish his or her objective of stopping the conversion of natural habitat by
time T'1, our social planner will need to use a policy. In this paper we shall consider two types of
policies. The first policy is the autonomous one and this policy is of the following type: The social
planner decides on some threshold level of utility Û that is independent of time. With this policy, our
social planner will stop the stochastic habitat conversion process (create a protected area) upon
receipt of the first information packet whose utility exceeds Û. For example, using this autonomous
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policy, if our social planner creates a protected area upon receipt of the fourth information packet,
then it must be true that U1#Û, U2#Û, U3#Û, and U4>Û. The second policy is the nonautonomous
policy and in this case the threshold level of utility is a function of time t. In other words, instead of
working with a constant Û, our social planner will now work with a time dependent threshold Û(t),
where Û(t)'(1&t)/(3&t).
There are five reasons for working with the time dependent threshold function
Û(t)'(1&t)/(3&t). First, the use of this function enables us to capture the dependence of the threshold
on time in a simple manner and it permits us to obtain an analytical solution to the problem described
in section 3.2 below. Second, even though the specified function is relatively straightforward, the use
of this function permits us to model and study the nonlinear dependence of time on the threshold.
Third, the use of the above function lets us compare the merits of autonomous and nonautonomous
policies directly. Fourth, the above specified function is consistent with our intuition that the social
planner’s decision making threshold ought to decline over time. Finally, there is a precedent (see
Batabyal (2001)) in the economics literature for studying this kind of threshold function. We now
proceed to our analysis of the autonomous policy.
3. Alternate Policies and their Effects
3.1. The Autonomous Policy
Our objective in this section is to compute the expected utility of our social planner when
(s)he uses an autonomous policy with utility threshold Û. To this end, let us first compute the
probability of creating a protected area by time T'1 when this policy is used. Because the utility
stochastic process deriving from the stochastic information packet process is a Poisson process with
rate ë'1, we can tell that the probability we seek is
10

Prob{creating protected area by T'1}'1&exp{&(1&Û)}.

(1)

Our next task is to ascertain the expected utility of the information packet that results in our social
planner agreeing to create a protected area by time T'1. Now, recall that these utilities are uniformly
distributed on the interval (0,1]. Hence, given that our social planner creates a protected area by time
T'1, the expected utility of the information packet that results in the stopping of the natural habitat
conversion process is (1%Û)/2. We can now ascertain our social planner’s expected utility EUA from
the creation of a protected area with an autonomous policy. This is given by multiplying (1%Û)/2 by
the probability on the right hand side (RHS) of equation (1). We get

EUA'[

1%Û
][1&exp{&(1&Û)}].
2

(2)

Equation (2) tells us that when an autonomous policy is used, the expected utility to the social
planner from the creation of a protected area is the product of two terms in square brackets. Both
these terms in the square brackets contain the utility threshold Û. Note that equation (2) is also our
social planner’s objective function. Consequently, with this information in mind, we can now ask the
following question: What value of the utility threshold Û should our social planner pick to maximize
his or her expected utility from the creation of a protected area? This question can be answered by
letting our social planner solve

maxÛ [[

1%Û
][1&exp{&(1&Û)}]].
2
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(3)

This is a straightforward but laborious maximization problem. Simplifying the maximand in equation
(3), we can rewrite it as maxÛ[1/2&(1/2)exp{&(1&Û)}%Û/2&(Û/2)exp{&(1&Û)}]. The first order
necessary

condition

to

this

expected

utility

maximization

problem

is

exp{&(1&Û)}%(Û/2)exp{&(1&Û)}&1/2'0. It is possible to rewrite this first order necessary
condition. This gives us loge(2%Û)&(1&Û)'0. Finally, this last equation can be expressed as

Û%loge(2%Û)'1.

(4)

(

Because Û0(0,1], it is easy to see that the solution to equation (4) is Û '0.2079. This means that
(

if our social planner sets the value of the utility threshold Û '0.2079, then (s)he will have maximized
his or her expected utility from stopping the natural habitat conversion process.
What is the maximized value of our social planner’s expected utility? This query can be
(

answered by substituting Û '0.2079 into equation (2). This tells us that our social planner’s
maximized expected utility from the creation of a protected area is

1%Û
(
EUA '[
2

(

(

][1&exp{&(1&Û )}]'0.330425.

(5)

Equation (5) tells us that the expected utility to our social planner when (s)he uses the optimal
autonomous policy is 0.330425. In other words, this is the highest level of expected utility that our
social planner can hope to attain with an autonomous policy. This state of affairs naturally leads to
the following question: Can our social planner do better by using a nonautonomous policy? We now
proceed to answer this question.
12

3.2. The Nonautonomous Policy
Our goal now is to calculate the social planner’s expected utility from the creation of a
protected area when (s)he uses the nonautonomous policy Û(t)'(1&t)/(3&t). Continuing in the same
manner as in the previous section, let us first ascertain the probability of stopping the habitat
conversion process by time T'1 when the above nonautonomous policy is used. Because the policy
being used now is time dependent, the probability that we’re interested in can be determined by
computing the likelihood of creating a protected area in a small time interval [t,t%dt]. To compute
this likelihood, we shall use two facts and the cumulative distribution function (cdf) for an
exponentially distributed random variable (see Ross (1996, p. 35)). The two facts are (i) the relevant
utility stochastic process is a Poisson process with rate ë'1 and (ii) the interarrival times for this
Poisson process are exponentially distributed random variables with mean equal to 1/ë'1/1'1 (see
Ross (1996, p. 64) and Taylor and Karlin (1998, p. 292) for additional details).Using these two facts
and the cdf for an exponentially distributed random variable, the likelihood we seek is

t

Prob{creating protected area within [t,t%dt]}'exp{& (1&Û(s))ds}{1&Û(t)}dt. (6)
m
0

Comparing equations (1) and (6), we see that the time dependence of the nonautonomous policy
complicates the computation of the probability of creating a protected area. We now need to calculate
the expected utility of the information packet that results in our social planner stopping the habitat
conversion process by time T'1. Once again, continuing as in the previous section, we obtain a
similar expression for this expected utility. Consequently, we can now determine our social planner’s
expected utility EUN from the creation of a protected area with a nonautonomous policy. This is
13

given by multiplying (1%Û(t))/2 by the probability on the RHS of equation (6) and then integrating
the resulting expression between 0 and 1. Mathematically, we have

1

t

1%Û(t)
]exp{& (1&Û(s))ds}{1&Û(t)}dt.
EUN' [
m
m
2
0

(7)

0

Equation (7) tells us that when a nonautonomous policy is used, the expected utility from the
creation of a protected area is the product of two terms. As in the previous section, both these terms
contain the utility threshold Û(@). Also, observe that equation (7) is our social planner’s objective
function. However, because of the time dependent nature of our social planner’s nonautonomous
(

policy, we cannot now calculate an optimal Û as we did in the previous section.
This notwithstanding, we can still ask: What is the maximized value of our social planner’s
expected utility when (s)he uses a nonautonomous policy? To answer this question, we will need to
complete the integrations in equation (7). Let us first complete the integration in the expression for
the probability of creating a protected area in the interval [t,t%dt], i.e., in the second term on the RHS
of equation (7). Integrating, we get

t

1 2
exp{& (1&Û(s))ds}{1&Û(t)}dt' (
)exp{2loge(3&t)}dt.
m
9 3&t

(8)

0

Using equation (8), we can greatly simplify the objective function delineated by equation (7). This
simplification yields

1

2
EUN' (2&t)dt.
9m
0
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(9)

Now completing the integration in equation (9), we get

1

(

EUN '

2
(2&t)dt'0.333333.
9m

(10)

0

Equation (10) tells us that the expected utility of our social planner when (s)he uses a nonautonomous
policy is 0.333333. In other words, this is the highest level of expected utility that our social planner
can hope to achieve with the nonautonomous policy Û(t)'(1&t)/(3&t). We now compare and contrast
the properties of autonomous and nonautonomous policies and then we discuss the magnitude of the
premium arising from the maintenance of temporal flexibility in decision making.
4. Autonomous Versus Nonautonomous Policies
In principle, for reasons given in section 1, we expect autonomous and nonautonomous
policies to yield very different payoffs to our social planner. Our analysis thus far allows us to shed
light on this and associated issues. In particular, we can use Table 1 to compare and contrast the
insert Table 1 about here
properties of these two distinct policies. Reading horizontally, the second row of Table 1 reveals the
basic difference in the two policies. In the autonomous case, the optimal value of the utility threshold Û
is fixed at 0.2079 and this value does not change with the passage of time. In contrast, when our
social planner uses a nonautonomous policy, the utility threshold is continually a function of time and
hence its optimal value varies with the passage of time.
The third row of Table 1 gives us exact values of the expected utility from the creation of a
protected area when these two policies are used by our social planner. Relative to an autonomous
policy, a nonautonomous policy allows a social planner to be flexible in the face of changing
15

conditions. In particular, the reader should note the nexus between this flexibility and the constraint
describing our social planner’s desire to stop the conversion of natural habitat by a certain time. To
see this connection plainly, consider the following example: We have chosen units so that the time
by which our social planner would like to create a protected area is T'1. For the purpose of this
example, let us measure time in years and suppose that the time constraint is T'40 years. Then, it
is reasonable to say that the optimal value of Û for our social planner at T'10 years will most likely
be different from the optimal value of Û at T'35 years. Now, in contrast with an autonomous policy,
the use of a nonautonomous policy allows our social planner to alter the value of Û over time and
hence, in general, this policy is more flexible and therefore more desirable. The third row of Table 1
(

(

shows that this reasoning is right because EUN '0.333333>0.330425'EUA .
How much more desirable is the nonautonomous policy? The simple answer is: Not much
more. As shown in the fourth row of Table 1, the premium associated with the maintenance of
temporal flexibility in decision making is positive but only 0.002908. Consequently, in the theoretical
framework of this paper, our social planner does almost as well by using an autonomous policy.
To summarize, we obtain the following five insights from our analysis thus far: First, the time
dependence of the threshold in section 3.2 permits our social planner to be flexible. Second, when
making habitat conversion stoppage decisions (biodiversity conservation decisions) over time and
under uncertainty, it pays to be flexible. Third, although the use of more complex nonautonomous
policies will most likely increase the magnitude of the flexibility premium, these more complex
nonautonomous policies often do not admit closed-form solutions. Fourth, we can view the decision
to create a protected area as a decision to invest in biodiversity. Finally, if we view the decision to
create a protected area as a decision to invest in biodiversity, then, the result depicted in the second
16

row of Table 1—that it is optimal to wait a while before investing— is consistent with the “value of
waiting to invest” result in the investment under uncertainty literature (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
5. Conclusions
In this paper we provided a theoretical analysis of the effects of alternate policies on the
decision to stop the conversion of natural habitat in a dynamic and stochastic framework. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first paper to provide a comparative analysis of the properties of
autonomous and nonautonomous policies in the context of the conservation of biodiversity. After
pointing out the basic difference between autonomous and nonautonomous policies, our analysis
showed that nonautonomous policies are generally more desirable than autonomous policies because
the expected utility from the creation of a protected area when a nonautonomous policy is used
exceeds the expected utility from the creation of a protected area with an autonomous policy. In other
words, there is a positive flexibility premium associated with the use of a nonautonomous policy.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. In what follows, we
suggest two possible extensions. First, note that the social planner’s optimal policy is of an “all or
nothing” type. In other words, the social planner either stops all conversion or permits all conversion
to continue. Following recent developments in the literature on the development of land over time
and under uncertainty (see Miller and Lad (1984) and Batabyal (1999)), it would be useful to examine
the social planner’s decision problem when partial stopping is a possibility.
Second, the time dependent decision rule that we’ve studied in this paper involves altering the
value of the utility threshold. However, the form of the policy itself does not change. Accordingly,
it would be useful to compare and contrast the properties of the nonautonomous policy of this paper
with a different policy that involves the temporal modification of the form of the policy. An analysis
17

of these aspects of the problem will allow richer analyses of the nexuses between alternate policies
and the decision to conserve biodiversity over time and under uncertainty.

Table 1
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A Comparison of Autonomous and Nonautonomous Conservation Policies
Criterion of Interest

Optimal Value of Utility

Autonomous Conservation

Nonautonomous

Policy

Conservation Policy
1&t
Û(t)'
3&t

(

Û '0.2079

Threshold
Maximal Expected Utility

(

(

EUA '0.330425

EUN '0.333333

from Creation of Protected
Area
(

(

EUN &EUA '0.002908>0

Premium from the
Maintenance of Temporal
Flexibility
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